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Abstract: Scientists and scholars in multiple fields have been discussing the
current geological epoch under the heading of the “Anthropocene” – an era
marked by the planetary impact of human activities (Crutzen and Stoermer 2000).
The epistemological shift brought about by this notion exposes the latent anthro-
pocentrism of narrative practices, raising a challenge taken up by narrative
theorists such as Erin James (2015) and Alexa Weik von Mossner (2017) in the
context of an “econarratology.” In this article, I examine the prime suspect for
anthropocentrism in narrative – namely, the notion of character as intrinsically
human-like. My point of departure is A. J. Greimas’s (1976) actantial model of
narrative, which I revisit and revise in light of work in the field of ecolinguistics
(Goatly 1996). I thus explore five strategies through which narrative may integrate
nonhuman characters that challenge both anthropocentrism and the subject-
object binary that anthropocentrism entails. I exemplify these strategies by dis-
cussing contemporary novels that deal with the Anthropocenic entanglement of
humanity and the nonhuman world.
Keywords: Narrative, Contemporary fiction, Nonhuman, Ecocriticism, Anthropo-
cene
1 Introduction
In Vibrant Matter (2010), a seminal contribution to an area of contemporary
philosophy known as “New Materialism,” Jane Bennett makes a case for the
autonomy and productivity of matter. For Bennett, inanimate things are constitu-
tively entangled with, and participate in, human activities. Bennett’s work is part
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of a wave of thinkers who have mounted philosophical arguments to unsettle the
metaphysical primacy of the human. Theorists such as Karen Barad (2007),
Timothy Morton (2010), or Steven Shaviro (2014) have taken aim at the notion –
rarely articulated as such, but implicit in many of our behavioral and cognitive
patterns – that humans have a metaphysical warrant to exploit nonhuman
animals as well as matter (including the natural resources of our planet). In an
edited collection, Richard Grusin (2015) grouped together many of these thinkers
under the heading of the “nonhuman turn.” The nonhuman raises a radical
challenge to anthropocentrism and to the idea of human exceptionality, under-
cutting binaries between (human) subjects and (nonhuman) objects. This is,
broadly speaking, the philosophical project in which Bennett’s Vibrant Matter is
embedded. In the first chapter of her book, Bennett employs narrative to stage the
breakdown of the subject-object distinction. She writes as follows:
The strangely vital things that will rise up to meet us in this chapter – a dead rat, a plastic
cap, a spool of thread – are characters in a speculative onto-story. The tale hazards an
account of materiality, even though it is both too alien and too close to see clearly and even
though linguistic means prove inadequate to the task. (2010: 3–4)
Bennett’s appeal to the medium of narrative to bolster her case for the vital
efficacy of matter is significant for several reasons. At one level, it testifies to
narrative’s power to demonstrate a philosophical argument in terms that are both
concrete and affectively resonant. At the same time, Bennett is raising the possibi-
lity of using narrative against the grain of what Monika Fludernik (1996: 13) has
called its “anthropomorphic bias”: namely, narrative’s tendency to foreground
human protagonists, psychological causality, and human-scale temporality and
spatiality. “The king died, then the queen died of grief,” E. M. Forster’s (1955
[1927]: 86) oft-cited example of plot, shows all the prototypical marks of the
human, from human characters to mental causation (“of grief”) to an inferred
chronology that can be plausibly measured in human-scale time – days and
months, not geological eras. Bennett’s “speculative onto-stories” suggest that
narrative may be able to move beyond this anthropomorphic bias. To understand
how this is possible, we can consider one of Bennett’s examples, a short story by
Franz Kafka, “Cares of a Family Man” (2005 [1919]). The protagonist of this
narrative is a mysterious entity called Odradek, which at first sight would seem to
be a mere tool: “it looks like a flat star-shaped spool for thread, and indeed it does
seem to have thread wound upon it; to be sure, they are only old, broken-off bits
of thread, knotted and tangled together, of the most varied sorts and colors”
(Kafka 2005: 428). But we soon discover that Odradek is able to hide, and even
speak and laugh (its laughter sounding “like the rustling of fallen leaves”; 2005:
428), and that it will survive the narrator’s children (hence the anxious “cares”
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hinted at by the title). For Bennett, Odradek blurs the boundary between sub-
jectivity and materiality, agency and passivity: “this animate wood exercises an
impersonal form of vitality” (2010: 7).
Figures like Odradek challenge the first and perhaps most important pillar of
narrative’s anthropomorphism: its bias towards human or human-like characters.
In an article co-authored with Lars Bernaerts, Luc Herman, and Bart Vervaeck
(2014), we examined the cognitive and interpretive challenges raised by nonhu-
man characters (and more specifically, in the context of the article, first-person
narrators). In the following pages I would like to extend that project, engaging
with the notion of character head-on and discussing the ways in which narrative –
and narrative theory – may attempt to extricate character from anthropomorphic
conceptions. How can narrative elevate the nonhuman – material objects, but
also large-scale processes such as globalization or the weather – to the position of
a character? What are the limits and the possibilities opened up by this operation?
These are key questions for what Erin James (2015) calls an “econarratology,” a
theory of narrative that foregrounds the interplay between narrative form and the
environmental imagination. Econarratology, in James’s 2015 book but also in
work by David Herman (2014, 2018) and Alexa Weik von Mossner (2017), starts to
move narrative theory beyond its anthropomorphic comfort zone.
This article contributes to these debates by developing a theory of character
attuned to the interrelation of humans and nonhuman processes in the “Anthro-
pocene,” which is Paul Crutzen’s term for the current geological era (Crutzen and
Stoermer 2000). The Anthropocene is defined by the planetary impact of human
activities, through various processes including the production of non-biodegrad-
able materials and the release of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. Not only
do these processes disrupt the balance of many ecosystems, triggering large-scale
species extinction, but they jeopardize the environment in which our species has
flourished. Human history shapes, and at the same time is shaped by, geological
and climatological phenomena (see Chakrabarty 2014). This is the fundamental
interrelation that the concept of Anthropocene brings into view, and that Timothy
Morton (2010: 28–33) captures by way of a metaphor, that of the human-nonhu-
man “mesh.” If one seeks to understand how narrative engages with and conveys
this interconnection, the notion of character – a key concept of narrative theory,
and a bulwark of anthropomorphism – would seem to be an obvious and perhaps
inevitable starting point. Broadly speaking, narrative tends to place human
characters in the agentive position, while nonhuman realities (including nonhu-
man animals and natural landscapes or processes) are relegated to the position of
objects: tools to further human ends, or a backdrop to human-centered events.
This is a general trend and does not apply to the same extent to all narratives, of
course. Appreciating the narratives that do put pressure on this anthropocentric
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set-up involves reconceptualizing the notion of character and opening it up to
nonhuman realities.
The resistance to an anthropomorphic understanding of character is not
entirely new. In his path-breaking work on the Russian folktale, Vladimir Propp
(1968 [1928]) was the first to develop a formal understanding of character, through
the equation of character and “function”: namely, the role a given character plays
within a narrative arc. For Propp, a character could be a hero, a dispatcher, a
helper, or a prize– all roles defined by semantic relations that were largely (though
not completely) abstract in the sense of being independent from psychological
factors. Propp’s work was immensely influential in structuralist narratology. In a
1972 article, Seymour Chatman summarizes as follows the structuralist theory of
character: “The structuralists wish to base their analyses strictly on what charac-
ters do in a story, not what they are – by some outside psychological measure”
(1972: 57; emphasis in the original). The culmination of that structuralist approach
is A. J. Greimas’s (1976) actantial model of narrative, which does away with char-
acter as an inherently mimetic concept and prefers to talk about “actants” – a term
that emphasizes the structural link between character and narrative-advancing
actions. Effectively, this approach reduces character to a textual device, and there-
fore would seem to undermine the notion’s inherent anthropomorphism. Does this
mean that the theory of character I am developing can simply adopt the structural-
ist model? In section 2 of this article, I answer that question in the negative. The
problem is that the structuralist approach, although it may seem to do away with
the human subjectivity of character, is in fact deeply committed to the subject-
object binary that philosophical work such as Bennett’s destabilizes. Put other-
wise, structuralist theories, by seeing character as a mere textual function, tend to
objectify it. By contrast, a non-anthropocentric theory of character should resist the
whole subject-object split and (to borrow Phelan’s [2007] terminology) move
beyond both a “mimetic,” anthropomorphic approach to character and a purely
“synthetic”understanding that sees it as an inert textualmechanism.
Developing this argument will require delving deeper into Greimas’s actantial
theory of narrative and spelling out why it is based on a dualistic conception of
the world, and of language in particular. Andrew Goatly’s (1996) seminal work on
“green grammar” in the field of ecolinguistics will help me link dualism to a
specific grammatical construction widespread in Indo-European languages –
namely, the transitive sentence, with its clear-cut separation between a gramma-
tical subject and a grammatical object. Greimas’s actantial model relies on transi-
tivity, and therefore cannot be adopted in the context of an econarratology with-
out substantive modification. In section 3, I will interrogate the ways in which
narrative can question this dualistic set-up via characters with recognizably
nonhuman features. Again, I will use Goatly’s ecolinguistics as a template to
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examine five narrative strategies that de-anthropomorphize character while re-
vealing the constitutive interdependency of human subjects and nonhuman
objects. Clearly, this inventory of strategies is not exhaustive, and there are many
overlaps among the formal devices I will discuss. Further, a theory along these
lines will not work for all narratives, and certainly not for the many narratives
that – more or less deliberately – take on board anthropocentric ideas. It is a
theory attuned to a particular corpus of stories that unsettle the human subject,
such as we find in the contemporary genres that fall under Adam Trexler’s (2015)
heading of “Anthropocene fiction” – from realistic “climate fiction,” such as
Barbara Kingsolver’s Flight Behavior (2012), to dystopian and science-fiction
novels such as Margaret Atwood’s Oryx and Crake (2003). The advantage of such
a theory is that it shows how the destabilization of the human is not just a matter
of theme but is inscribed, by some of these narratives at least, into the very formal
logic of story. Obviously, the notion of character – bound up as it is with human
subjectivity – is key to this destabilization.
2 Structuralist precedents?
Greimas’s actantial model of narrative builds on, and extends, the parallel drawn
by Propp between the workings of story and the syntactic organization of natural
language. In an essay originally published in French in 1973, Greimas (1976: 106)
distinguishes between actants and actors, the former being an abstract function
comparable to subject and object in grammar, the latter being the instantiation of
those roles in what we would informally call the characters of a narrative. Greimas
envisages two possible “elementary schemata” of actantial organization: subject
→ object, and sender → object → receiver (1976: 108; see Figure 1). In the first, a
subject acts upon an object, whereas in the second a subject (the sender) trans-
mits an object to the receiver. These roles are instantiated in countless ways by
narrative: for instance, the object transmitted in the second schema may be some-
thing material (a sword, a letter, an inheritance) or something intangible (knowl-
edge, a tale).
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Figure 1: The two actantial schemata of narrative, according to Greimas (1976, 108).
At first glance, Greimas’s schemata seem successful in uncoupling the actant
from the human. It is no coincidence that Bruno Latour’s actor-network theory –
an influential precedent for the nonhuman turn – lifts the term from Greimas: as
Latour acknowledges, actor-network theory “uses the technical word actant that
comes from the study of literature” (2005: 54). In broad strokes, actor-network
theory argues for the role played by technology as well as socio-cultural struc-
tures in producing what we normally think of as human “agency” – which in fact
arises from complex human-nonhuman interactions. Latour refers to these non-
human entities as “actants.” Greimas anticipates this view, in the domain of
narrative theory, by suggesting that a material object or an abstract entity such
as capitalism can be actants in narrative, just like human characters. Human
subjectivity and identity are here relegated to a matter of “discourse” – a surface
manifestation that does not reach into the deep actantial level of formal rela-
tions.
Yet, even as it evacuates the human subject, Greimas’s model does not go
very far in exorcising the specter of anthropocentrism. The reasons for this are
twofold. The first is more obvious, and has to do with the problematic claim to
scientific objectivity of structuralist models. In evacuating the subject from narra-
tive’s deep structures, Greimas effaces his own subjectivity: he construes narra-
tive as an object “out there,” instead of taking into account the deep entangle-
ment between storytelling and human experience, which has been emphasized
by more recent, mind-oriented models of narrative (Herman 2013; Caracciolo
2014). The subject-object divide is thus built into Greimas’s analytical method – a
problematic assumption when viewed from the perspective of an econarratologi-
cal theory of character. Secondly, and more importantly for my purposes here, in
drawing an analogy between narrative and sentence structure Greimas implicitly
treats as a universal of syntax a particular kind of sentence – namely, the
transitive sentence: both his actantial schemata are predicated on the possibility
of distinguishing between a grammatical subject (or sender in the second schema)
and a grammatical object (what is being acted upon, or what is being transmitted
in the second schema). This is a transitive organization, and it is deeply bound up
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with a dualistic worldview. Work in the field of ecolinguistics will help me unpack
this idea in the next section.
2.1 Beyond transitivity
The point of departure of Goatly’s (1996) influential article on “Green Grammar
and Grammatical Metaphor” is that transitive sentences tend to cast the agent
into the position of a grammatical subject impinging on a grammatical object
that is both inert and passive. Kristin Davidse and Sara Geyskens put this point
more formally, taking the sentence “He spread the bread” as an example: “The
causal model encoded by transitive [sentences] is one of directedness ..., in
which an Actor directs action onto a Goal. We have a unilateral model of
causality here in the sense that all the energy involved in the causal event
comes from the Actor, viz. the bread butterer. The Goal, the bread, undergoes
this causal event in a fully passive, inert manner” (1998: 158). Goatly’s intuition
is that it doesn’t matter if the grammatical subject is semantically a human, or a
nonhuman animal, or a material object, or an abstract concept: the dualistic
notion of agency as mastery is deeply implicated in sentence structure. Syntax
is thus bound up with the view that passive matter can be shaped and exploited
at the subject’s will. This does not mean that such view is entirely created by
linguistic structure, as a strong version of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis would
have it. Goatly’s article only traces a correlation between language and culture,
where language does not necessarily determine the subject-object divide but
plays a central role in reinforcing it; as Goatly explains, paraphrasing the title of
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s (1980) well-known book on conceptual
metaphor, “transitive effective structures are conventionalized grammatical me-
taphors, metaphors we die by, language which perpetuates the myth of power”
(1996: 558).
Instead, Goatly’s suggestion is that, in order to dispel this myth, “our image
of the world has to become one in which processes predominate and human
Actors disappear” (1996: 554). An example of a linguistic system that appears to
implement this worldview is Blackfoot, an Algonquian language spoken by
Native American tribes living in the northwestern U. S. and Canada: “a native
speaker of Blackfoot ... can speak all day long without uttering a single noun –
and ... this is the exception rather than the rule” (from an Internet post quoted in
Goatly 2011: 80). The processual view of reality that emerges from Blackfoot is, for
Goatly, “in step with recent, scientific, post-relativity models of the physical and
biological universe” (2001: 231), including – arguably – the notion of metaphysi-
cal parity between humans and nonhuman realities.
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To return to Greimas, the main problem with his structuralist theory of
actants is that it reproduces – unwittingly – the dualistic power structure implicit
in transitive sentences, with all that it entails ideologically. Put otherwise, a
theory of character that is attuned to the causal efficacy of the material world will
never get off the ground if we take syntactic transitivity as a starting point. What
alternatives are available in the linguistic system, and how do they lay the
groundwork for a new understanding of character qua actant? Goatly points out
that, even if English is biased towards transitivity, it does not lack grammatical
resources to question the separation between subject and object, and by exten-
sion human agency and the material world. These are the five grammatical tools
discussed by Goatly (1996: 547–554):
1. The so-called “ergative system,” which is a sentence structure different from
the transitive system in that the grammatical object participates in the action
initiated by the subject. In Davidse and Geyskens’s words: “the causal model
encoded by ergative [sentences] is not one of directing action onto a goal, but
one of instigating a process involving the second participant” (1998: 158–159).
Examples are “John opened the door,” or – perhaps even more clearly –
“John walked the dog.”
2. The use of words like “it” and “there” in sentences like “it rains” and “there
has been an accident on the highway.” As Goatly puts it: “This structure
makes it possible to state a proposition involving a process [such as rainfall
or the accident, in my examples], without mentioning the participant ...
involved. ... The use of relational processes instead of material ones is a
gesture towards de-humanization of world view” (1996: 549).
3. Reciprocal verbs, which foreground interaction and therefore the bi-direc-
tionality of a causal process: for instance, “John and Mary met.”
4. The promotion of a place or environment to the position of grammatical
subject, in sentences such as “the bed was crawling with ants” (instead of
“ants were crawling all over the bed”).
5. Nominalization, which turns a verb into a grammatical noun (for instance,
“the condensation of water” for “the water condenses”). Nominalizations
extrapolate from the agent responsible for a given action; thus, they can be
used to call attention to the processual nature of reality, as languages like
Blackfoot can be said to do.
Goatly hastens to add that none of these grammatical devices is, in and of itself,
sufficient to undermine dualism and anthropocentric assumptions; but they at
least point to a use of language that is more aligned with what both science and
contemporary philosophy tell us about the deep imbrication of human and non-
human realities. The next section of this article explores, in a speculative vein,
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how these grammatical devices may serve as building blocks for an econarratolo-
gical account of character. Unlike Greimas, I am not interested in an all-encom-
passing theory of narrative but in more localized strategies through which parti-
cular stories may deploy characters that resist notions of human mastery and
exceptionalism. I will thus survey the syntactic structures identified by Goatly and
suggest possible narrative-level equivalents, explaining how they broaden our
understanding of character as actant. I will focus on fictional narratives in the
generic tradition of the novel, but similar devices may be used in other discourse
genres, such as oral storytelling or news reports.
3 The ergative system
In the ergative system, as we have seen, agency is a matter not of direct causation
but of “instigation,” and extends from the grammatical subject to the grammati-
cal object, involving both. In the sentence “John walked the dog,” for instance,
John initiates the action, but he and the dog co-participate in it. Something similar
happens in the plot of The Echo Maker (2006), a novel by Richard Powers. At the
forefront of the novel is the human drama of a car accident and its aftermath. The
victim, a character named Mark, suffers brain damage and develops a psychiatric
condition known as “Capgras syndrome”: he views his sister, Karin, as an im-
postor, a lookalike of his real sister. The backdrop to these events is the Platte
river in Nebraska, where thousands of sandhill cranes congregate every year, on
their way from Central America to Canada and Alaska. In parallel with Mark’s
slow and uneasy recovery is the attempt, on the part of a group of corporate
investors, to build a tourist resort on the banks of the river, which would seriously
endanger the cranes. This subplot follows a standard transitive pattern, which
places the human in an agentive position, and the nonhuman world (meaning
both the river and the cranes) in the position of a disempowered object.
However, Mark’s mysterious mental condition complicates and to some ex-
tent subverts this pattern. Not only are the cranes physically present when Mark’s
car skids out of control, but their fate seems intimately bound up with Mark’s. In
his delusion, he is convinced that the surgeons implanted a bird’s brain into his
skull during the operation that followed his accident. In this way, the cranes are
symbolically implicated in the destabilization of the character’s subjectivity,
which points to a more general instability of the human subject. Powers’s narra-
tive reinforces this effect by portraying the birds not as individualized agents but
as a collective actant, endowed with a group mentality that conflicts with the
presumed autonomy and singularity of human selfhood: “Then thousands of
them lift up in flood. The beating surface of the world rises, a spiral calling
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upward on invisible thermals. Sounds carry them all the way skyward, clacks and
wooden rattles, rolling, booming, bugling, clouds of living sound. Slowly, the
mass unfurls in ribbons and disperses into thin blue” (2006: 429). Powers’s
metaphorical language blurs the dividing line between the cranes’ coordinated
behavior and the surrounding landscape, transforming them into a “flood,” “a
beating surface,” or “clouds” that eventually merge with the “thin blue” of the
sky. This image of the cranes as a collective actant affects the human characters
as well; for instance, it defamiliarizes Karin’s view of humanity, in a key passage
in which she realizes that “the whole [human] race suffered from Capgras. Those
birds danced like our next of kin, looked like our next of kin, called and willed
and parented and taught and navigated all just like our blood relations. Half their
parts were still ours. Yet humans waved them off: impostors” (2006: 347–348).
The cranes are thus a full-fledged actant in Powers’s novel insofar as they co-
participate in Mark’s accident and determine its narrative and ethical stakes.
Crucially, this does not happen by way of direct causation, but through the
symbolic instigation of Mark’s condition: “the cranes crashed Mark’s car,” would
be the closest sentence-length equivalent of the plot. Through this ergative
structure, with the cranes as a nonhuman actant, the novel is able to locate the
human within a longer, evolutionary history that undermines any separation
between human agency and an allegedly inert natural world.
3.1 Filler “there” and “it”
Goatly’s second device is the use of filler words like “there” or “it” in existential
statements, or to denote atmospheric phenomena. Because these words fulfill a
purely grammatical function, their semantic emptiness draws attention to the
processual nature of the scenario that is being verbally conveyed: in a sentence
like “it is cold today,” the “it” is not an agent or subject, but only stands in for
meteorological conditions defined by a certain perceived temperature. In narra-
tive terms, this device is reminiscent of what Ann Banfield (1987) calls “empty
center texts”: descriptive passages in which the subject position is left vacant,
and a scene is verbally recorded despite the absence of any observers. The deictic
center of this scene – the location that would normally be occupied by an
experiencing subject – remains empty. Banfield takes as an example the inter-
ludes of Virginia Woolf’s The Waves (2011 [1931]), which portray a sea landscape
at different times of the day, without any character being present on the scene.
For Monika Fludernik, these passages contain subtle hints of subjectivity that
encourage the reader to mentally project into the empty deictic center: “Just as, in
figural narrative, the reader is invited to see the fictional world through the eyes
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of a reflector character, in the present text the reader also reads through a text-
internal consciousness, but since no character is available to whom one could
attribute such consciousness, the reader directly identifies with a story-internal
position” (1996: 150).
But a reading strategy more in line with econarratological interests would be
to halt or at least suspend this readerly projection, viewing the emptiness of these
scenarios as a window onto a world untouched by human presence. This is
something that Woolf herself strongly cues in the famous “Time Passes” section
of To the Lighthouse (2000 [1927]), which registers material changes in a house
during a ten-year period in which it is left uninhabited. Greg Garrard (2012)
discusses Woolf’s “Time Passes” as an instance of what he calls “disanthropy,” a
vision of the world without humans. Yet, for Garrard, attempts at disanthropy in
verbal narrative are bound to fail: “The helpless allegiance of written genres to
narrative voice and anthropomorphic characterization makes disanthropic litera-
ture conspicuously self-contradictory, and probably impossible” (2012: 43). In-
stead, Garrard turns to cinema as a medium that, due to the “ostensible imperson-
ality of the camera” (2012: 43), is uniquely equipped to represent human absence.
Garrard does not discuss Banfield’s concept, and downplays the power of literary
language to break the “helpless allegiance” to “anthropomorphic characteriza-
tion.” In fact, empty deictic center passages like Woolf’s capitalize on what
Garrard calls their “self-contradictory” nature, inviting readers to undergo and
value an experience of absence that exposes the rich vitality of the world without
humans.
Jim Crace’s novel Being Dead (1999) is a powerful example of how empty
center descriptions can probe nonhuman materiality. The novel narrates the
events that led to a couple’s murder on a deserted beach. What takes center stage
in the narrative – rather morbidly – is the material history of the two dead bodies,
whose decomposition is described in painstaking detail even if there is no full-
fledged character on the scene. Consider, for instance, this passage: “But the rain,
the wind, the shooting stars, the maggots and the shame had not succeeded yet in
blowing them away or bringing to an end their days of grace. There’d been no
thunderclap so far. His hand was touching her. The flesh on flesh. The fingertip
across the tendon strings. He still held on. She still was held” (1999: 102). The
description features the equivalent of an “it” or an existential “there” where we
would expect a human-like observer: it foregrounds process and the slow but
inevitable decomposition of the bodies on the beach, conveying a cosmic and not
entirely unironic perspective on the two characters’ death. The absence of human
spectators is made so salient by the narrative that it becomes an anomalous,
ghostly (and ghastly) actant – a reminder of the nonhuman processes that enfold
the human and constitute its ultimate fate.
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3.2 Reciprocal verbs
Reciprocal verbs place two subjects in an agentive role, stressing the reciprocity
of an action without establishing a subject-object (and therefore inherently hier-
archical) relation: “John and Mary fought” is dramatically different from the
transitive construction “John beat Mary.” A degree of reciprocity is present in all
narratives that probe the interrelation between human and nonhuman realities.
However, from the perspective I am exploring in this article, the interrelation
should not only be the thematic upshot of a narrative, but should be inscribed
into its progression, with nonhuman events and elements becoming actants.
Narratives focusing on catastrophe are a particularly salient example of recipro-
city at this level: a catastrophe is something that intervenes in human history and
discloses, in Kate Rigby’s words, “the entanglement – material, but potentially
also moral – of human and nonhuman actors and factors in the etiology, unfold-
ing, and aftermath of catastrophes that turn out to straddle the dubious nature-
culture divide” (2013: 214).
We find many instances of catastrophic reciprocity in the popular genre of
postapocalyptic fiction. In Colson Whitehead’s novel Zone One (2011), for exam-
ple, the zombies (here known as “skels”) are a collective nonhuman actant, which
the narrator explicitly compares to the effects of anthropogenic climate change:
“The ocean [of the skels] had overtaken the streets, as if the news programs’
global warming simulations had finally come to pass and the computer-generated
swells mounted to drown the great metropolis” (2011: 302). Whitehead’s figurative
language establishes an intricate network of reciprocity: the skels are first com-
pared to a nonhuman location, the ocean, while their invasion of the metropolis
is assimilated to global warming (a phenomenon fueled by human activity),
which in turn is seen through the lens of human technology (a computer simula-
tion). Even as the skels are a fully nonhuman actant in the novel, the simile works
towards a redistribution of agency across the human-nonhuman divide.
The plot of Zone One magnifies this sense of reciprocal entanglement by
shuttling back and forth between two time frames: the protagonist’s childhood,
before the virus outbreak that led to the zombie apocalypse, and the current,
postapocalyptic scenario in which the skels are about to break into the defensive
wall that was erected in lower Manhattan. These frequent, and mostly unan-
nounced, flashbacks frustrate the reader’s attempts to establish a linear chronol-
ogy, mirroring the disorientation experienced by the protagonist himself – what
the novel refers to, ironically, as his “postapocalyptic stress disorder” (2011: 69).
The trauma of the zombie invasion, and the subsequent collapse of organized
society, threaten to turn humans into zombie-like creatures devoid of a coherent
sense of self (more on this in Caracciolo 2018a). At the same time, Whitehead’s
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original contribution to the zombie genre is the invention of so-called “straggler”
skels, who (unlike regular skels) are condemned to re-enact a gesture or haunt a
location that meant something to them in their pre-skel life – a clear manifesta-
tion of the psychological cycles of trauma. An inkling of the skels’ humanity is
thus poignantly preserved. The figure of the straggler, along with the psychologi-
cally motivated narrative structure of the novel, steer clear of a sharp dichotomi-
zation between skels and humans and instead stress their reciprocal relation.
3.3 Promotion of a place to subject
Goatly’s promotion of place to grammatical subject has a straightforward narra-
tive equivalent: stylistic and narrative strategies can push the space of the setting,
which typically serves as a mere backdrop to human characters and events,
towards an agentive position. For instance, in an insightful ecostylistic reading of
Amitav Ghosh’s The Hungry Tide (2004), Elisabetta Zurru (2017) argues that the
landscape of the Sundarbans on the Bay of Bengal is one of the main actants in
Ghosh’s novel, entering a reciprocal relationship with the human characters.
Zurru’s analysis shows that “the linguistic level turns ‘the setting of the novel’ into
an active, major character in the story” (2017: 203–204) through, in particular, the
personification of the river Matla, in sentences such as “the Matla laughed its
mental laugh” or “the Matla took pity” on someone (quoted in Zurru 2017: 230).
An even more striking example of promotion of place to narrative actant is
Area X in Jeff VanderMeer’s Southern Reach trilogy (VanderMeer 2014 a, 2014 b,
2014c). Area X is a coastal region in North America where the ecosystem shows
some serious, and inexplicable, anomalies. The U. S. government dispatches a
series of research teams to investigate, but these expeditions repeatedly (and
dramatically) fail, suggesting that the anomalies run deeper than previously
thought: the government’s official version points to an environmental cata-
strophe, but there are strong indications that Area X was occupied by an alien life
form that has radically altered the landscape. Just like the Sundarbans in Ghosh’s
novel, Area X becomes an actant, but in a way that avoids direct personification,
instead emphasizing Area X’s nonhuman opacity and unreadability: “nothing
about language, about communication, could bridge the divide between human
beings and Area X” (VanderMeer 2014 c: 311). When, in the course of the trilogy,
Area X starts expanding and incorporating the rest of the world, there is little
doubt that its behavior displays intentionality, but its exact motivations remain
unclear and deeply perplexing; as one of the main characters reflects, she “felt
that if she could make Area X react, then she would somehow throw it off course.
Even though we didn’t know what course it was on” (2014b: 262).
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Ultimately, however, the physical expansion of Area X proves less unsettling
than its capacity to shape and control the minds of those who come into contact
with it. Consider the following passage: “That landscape was impinging on them
now. The temperature dipped and rose violently. There were rumblings deep
underground that manifested as slight tremors. The sun came to them with a
‘greenish tinge’ as if ‘somehow the border were distorting our vision’” (2014a:
164). The idea is not just that the trilogy’s spatial setting informs the characters’
existential and material situation – which would be a simple inversion of the
transitive subject-object structure – but that it becomes deeply implicated in their
actions and psychological states. Through the actantial mediation of place, the
nonhuman infiltrates both the storyworld and the characters’ psychology. This
process culminates in the third volume of the trilogy, in which several chapters
are focalized by Ghost Bird, an anthropomorphic emanation of Area X: far from
being straightforwardly personified, the landscape of Area X thus ends up taking
over and nonhumanizing the human.
3.4 Nominalization
Nominalization uses a noun to capture a process normally denoted by a verb,
thus eliding the agents involved in that process. This is, fundamentally, an
operation of linguistic abstraction, in two ways: the noun abstracts from a specific
event (“the evaporation of water” is more general than “the water evaporates”),
and the noun abstracts from the participants in that event (i. e., who or what
caused the water to evaporate). How does this translate into narrative terms? A
possible equivalent are narratives that foreground an abstract nonhuman pro-
cess, which displaces human intentionality as the driving force of the plot. In
Marie-Laure Ryan’s (1991) seminal account, plot is both triggered by and deter-
mined in its progression by the beliefs and desires of human (or human-like)
characters. But in a novel like Kurt Vonnegut’s Galápagos (2011 [1985]), the
narrative progression appears to be governed by a long series of coincidences and
unlikely outcomes: if humanity survives a catastrophic virus outbreak, it is not
due to the survivors’ efforts but thanks to the unintended, and surprising, con-
sequences of their actions. In this way, the logic of the plot mirrors the haphazard,
chance-driven logic of natural evolution (a major player in the novel), as I have
argued in more detail elsewhere (Caracciolo 2018c). Evolution thus becomes an
abstract, nonhuman actant undermining expectations of human mastery over the
course of the narrative.
Another example of this strategy is Jeanette Winterson’s novel The Stone Gods
(2009 [2007]), which adopts an abstract pattern – the loop – as a formal template
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for the plot. The novel suggests that every civilization is bound to cause its own
demise through the mindless exploitation of natural resources; the next civiliza-
tion will have to start from scratch, in a loop of Nietzschean eternal recurrence.
Halfway through the novel (Winterson 2009: 54–55), this idea is allegorized by
the parable-like narrative of a character who commits suicide, then is given
another chance by an angel, if only to commit suicide again, countless times. At
another level, the novel traces a strange loop by way of metalepsis, when a copy
of The Stone Gods makes a surprise appearance in the storyworld: “‘What’s that?’
Spike asked. ‘It’s what I told you about, today, yesterday, when, I don’t know
when, it seems a lifetime ago. The Stone Gods.’ ‘I wonder who left it there?’ ‘It was
me.’ ‘Why, Billie?’ A message in a bottle. A signal. But then I saw it was still there
... round and round on the Circle Line. A repeating world” (2009: 203; ellipsis in
the original). This insistently thematized loop thus becomes a spatial model for
the logic of the narrative, uncoupling – like evolution in Vonnegut’s novel – the
progression of the story from any sense of overarching human intentionality. Both
Galápagos and The Stone Gods thus offer narrative equivalents of nominalization
as Goatly discusses it: abstract concepts (respectively, natural evolution and
loop-like recurrence) are transformed into actants, determining the characters’
fate and putting the nonhuman in control of the narrative.
4 Conclusion
This article revisited Greimas’s notion of “actant” from a perspective informed by
the nonhuman turn and contemporary discussions on the Anthropocene. The
structuralist approach to character, which Greimas systematized in his work,
aimed to extricate character in narrative from a purely mimetic understanding.
Thus, Greimas’s actantial model promises to de-anthropomorphize the concept of
character and speaks to contemporary philosophical work that questions the
metaphysical separation between human and nonhuman realities (as demon-
strated by Latour’s adoption of the term “actant” in his actor-network theory).
However, from the perspective of what Erin James (2015) calls an “econarratol-
ogy,” Greimas’s operation falls short: his structuralist model rests on a syntactic
system – transitivity – that is fundamentally dualistic and closely bound up with
anthropocentric assumptions. To overcome this limitation, we need to think more
carefully about linguistic devices that serve as sites of resistance to an anthropo-
centric ideology and can potentially expose the co-constitution of human subjec-
tivity and nonhuman realities. Goatly’s work in the field of ecolinguistics offers
helpful suggestions as to where to find these devices in the linguistic system. In
this article, I have attempted to scale up these devices to the level of whole
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narratives, tracing them in a corpus of contemporary novels that explicitly ad-
dress the Anthropocenic interrelation of humans and nonhuman processes. This
focus on contemporary fiction was determined pragmatically, but the five strate-
gies I have discussed are likely to be found in both nonfictional narrative genres
(e. g., conversational storytelling) and in fiction that predates the concept of
Anthropocene and the current ecological crisis. Further research is needed to
illuminate historical differences in the use of these strategies, as well as differ-
ences across the fiction-nonfiction divide.
On a purely conceptual level, it is important to point out that my approach to
character is anything but the systematic theory of narrative that Greimas sought
to develop. But systematicity was not my goal in this article. Opening up the
notion of character to nonhuman actants is, necessarily, an explorative and
speculative project that strives to read between the lines of narrative’s anthropo-
centric dominant – its bias towards the human scale. Conceptualizing actants in
this way requires expanding our understanding of causality (see Caracciolo
2018b): the modes of causality involved by nonhuman realities are, clearly,
alternative to the psychological causation of human characters’ beliefs and inten-
tions – the traditional stuff of storytelling. The thrust of the econarratological
theory of character I have started to outline in this article is that narrative, and
particularly fictional narrative, has the capacity to probe modes of causal efficacy
that are alternative to human agency and subjectivity.
It may be objected that there is a degree of metaphorical slippage in my
overhaul of the concept of actant: we have seen that tides and cranes and even
abstract scientific models can become actants in narrative; isn’t this “just” a
metaphor? The challenge of developing a theory of narrative geared towards
nonhuman realities lies precisely in learning to move beyond dichotomies of this
kind, including dichotomies between the literal and the metaphorical use of
concepts. Undoubtedly, attributing intentionality to nonhuman realities involves
a metaphorical leap, because a powerful combination of cognitive predisposi-
tions and cultural factors (especially in a Western context) leads us to regard
these realities as inert and passive. As Edward Slingerland puts it: “The dualism
advocated by Plato and Descartes was not a historical or philosophical accident,
but rather a development of an intuition that comes naturally to us, as bearers of
theory of mind: agents are different from things. Agents actively think, choose,
and move themselves; things can only be passively moved” (2008: 394). Yet the
metaphorical extension of human-scale concepts such as agency and intention-
ality has great heuristic value, in that it can reveal the ways in which nonhuman
realities resist anthropomorphic (and metaphorical) appropriation. Metaphors,
and particularly the creative metaphors that are deployed by literary narrative,
thus participate in a process of discovery of human-nonhuman entanglements
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(see Caracciolo et al. under review). If we dismiss the notion of nonhuman actant
as a “mere” metaphor, we have already closed the door on that possibility of
discovery.
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